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Key Points 
In its Communication on an Energy Union published in February 2015, the European Commission 
committed itself to “explore the full potential of liquefied natural gas (LNG), including as a back-up 
in crisis situations when insufficient gas is coming into Europe through the existing pipeline system”1 
and to address the potential of gas storage in Europe by developing a comprehensive LNG and 
storage strategy by the end of 2015 or early in 2016. 
This is a comprehensible move in the current context. Geopolitical tensions between the EU and 
Russia explain the EU’s willingness to further diversify its supply sources of natural gas to reinforce 
its long-term energy security on the one hand, and to strengthen its ability to solve future crises on 
the other hand. Moreover, the current market dynamics could support diversification towards LNG. 
Increasing the flexibility of LNG trade, decreasing LNG prices and LNG charter rates and an apparent 
price convergence between the European and the Asia-Pacific LNG imports would all reinforce the 
economic viability of such a strategy.    
This Policy Brief makes three main points: 
 For the LNG and gas storage strategy to work, it needs to be embedded in the realities of the 
natural gas market. 
 The key to a successful LNG strategy is to develop sufficient infrastructure. 
 The LNG strategy needs an innovation component. 
 
                                                   
1 “A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy”, 
Communication from the Commission, COM(2015) 80 final, 25 February 2015 (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:1bd46c90-bdd4-11e4-bbe1-01aa75ed71a1.0001.03/DOC_1&format=PDF 
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The LNG and gas storage strategy will 
need to be embedded in the market 
realities  
In order to be effective and to avoid any further 
serious mismatches between investments and 
market reality, the LNG and gas storage strategy 
should be part of a broader natural gas strategy. 
This latter strategy should not only consider 
issues related to the security of EU gas supplies 
but should also take into account potential future 
developments of European gas demand.  
Regarding the supply side, the European 
Commission seems to hesitate in its consultation 
paper between a laissez-faire approach (“How 
much LNG comes to the EU will ultimately 
depend on global gas prices”) and a more pro-
active or even interventionist attitude (“The EU 
will use all its foreign policy instruments … to 
ensure that the EU has full access to the benefits 
of the growing global market in LNG”). In reality, 
the supply of natural gas will largely be 
determined by market forces. LNG will come to 
the EU market, provided the EU market is 
attractive and a clear, consistent EU energy 
policy is in place.  
Therefore, the LNG strategy should not be too 
prescriptive on issues related to the LNG supply, 
both in terms of EU LNG infrastructure and 
potential future exporting countries, as 
investments will need to come from private 
companies and market fundamentals can change 
quickly. One exception, however, may be for the 
strategy to find a cost-effective role for LNG in 
source diversification in Eastern European 
countries (see next section on infrastructure). 
Related to this, the strategy also needs to address 
the dichotomy between aspirations to increase 
security of gas supplies with LNG and the 
current reality of the EU playing the role of a 
residual market (i.e. “getting what Asian 
countries do not need or cannot afford”). 
                                                   
2 BP, Statistical Review 2014.  
3 Eurogas, Statistical Report 2014 (www.eurogas.org/ 
uploads/media/Eurogas_Statistical_Report_2014.pdf). 
Gas demand, on the other hand, will continue to 
be influenced by European and national policy 
measures, including in the decarbonisation 
context. EU gas demand contracted by 12% 
between 2008 and 2013,2 and the future of the 
blue fuel in the European energy mix remains 
uncertain in a context of low economic growth, 
rising energy efficiency levels, the increasing 
share of renewables and the inability of the EU 
ETS to trigger a coal-to-gas switch in the power 
sector. The LNG strategy should thus seek to 
define a space for LNG in the overall demand 
equation – taking into account the whole energy 
system and interactions between different energy 
sectors (e.g. between gas and power markets). 
This is a fundamental issue, which is largely 
ignored by the consultation paper. The only gas 
demand-side related issue addressed by 
Commission’s paper is “LNG use in transport”, 
which represents a negligible fraction of EU gas 
demand. Transport accounted for less than 0.5% 
of overall EU gas demand in 2013.3 
Focusing only on the LNG and gas storage 
sectors while not addressing the issues related to 
the overall EU gas market is likely to result in 
inefficient investments – as was the case in the 
recent past – or, more likely, in no future 
investment in either terminals or pipelines. 
Between 2008 and 2014 the regasification 
capacity of the EU increased by around 58% from 
some 124 billion cubic meters per year (bcma) to 
196 bcma.4 At the same time, and as noted in the 
consultation paper, the volume of LNG imports 
decreased to 45 bcm in 2013, driving the 
utilisation rate of EU LNG terminals down to 
24%. It is important to note, however, that a low 
utilisation rate does not necessarily mean that an 
asset is stranded. Stranded assets are those that 
are not economically viable. Terminals required 
by the market may still be economically viable 
even with low utilisation rates, for example when 
they are used for arbitrage. 
4 GIE, LNG Map Dataset (www.gie.eu/ 
download/maps/2015/2015%20GLE%20LNG%20M
ap%20database.xlsxa). 
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Indeed, increasing contractual flexibility5 made it 
possible to redirect LNG from the depressed EU 
gas market to Japan and South Korea, which 
were seeking to replace nuclear power 
generation with natural gas after the Fukushima 
nuclear disaster and were willing to pay the 
‘Asian premium’ (up to twice EU hub prices). 
Since mid-2014, a combination of factors (mild 
weather, nuclear restarts in South Korea, 
additional supply from PNG LNG and Australia, 
increasing energy efficiency and China’s ‘new 
normal’) resulted in an oversupplied LNG 
market in the Asia-Pacific region and lower spot 
LNG prices to the levels of averaged European 
gas imports. Moreover, the falling oil price is 
filtering through the JCC-linked long-term 
contracts, resulting in an average price of 
$8.5/MMbtu for Japan. The disappearing ‘Asian 
premium’ resulted in the collapse of LNG re-
exports from Europe to Asia (viable when the 
spread is over $1.75/MMbtu)6 and an increase of 
EU LNG imports by 24% year-on year in the first 
quarter of 2015.7  
Figure 1. Gas price dynamics – the disappearing ‘Asian premium’? 
 
Source: World Bank, METI 
                                                   
5 LNG trade became more flexible as a result of the 
European Commission’s efforts to eliminate territorial 
restrictions from long-term LNG contracts and the 
willingness of certain suppliers (mainly Qatar) to 
negotiate flexible contracts with diversion rights. 
For instance, see European Commission (2007), 
Commission and Algeria reach agreement on 
territorial restrictions and alternative clauses in gas 
supply contracts (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-07-1074_en.htm). 
On Qatar’s gas monetisation strategy, see Bassam 
Fattouh, Howard V. Rogers and Peter Stewart (2015), 
“The US Shale Gas Revolution and its Impact on 
Qatar’s Position in Gas Markets” (https://gallery. 
mailchimp.com/20fec43d5e4f6bc717201530a/files/T
he_US_Shale_Gas_Revolution_and_Its_Impact_on_Q
atar_s_Position_in_Gas_Markets_March_2015.pdf). 
6 Platts, “Minimum Japan Korea Marker winter net 
forward price to pull European LNG seen at 
$9.20/MMBtu”, 15 July 2015 
(http://www.platts.com/latest-news/natural-
gas/london/minimum-japan-korea-marker-winter-
netforward-26149124). 
7 European Commission, Quarterly Report Energy on 
European Gas Markets, Volume 8, Issue 1, first quarter 
of 2015 (https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/ 
files/documents/quarterly_report_on_european_gas
_markets_q1_2015.pdf). 
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This raises a number of issues.   
1) With oil prices remaining below $60/barrel, 
oil-linked long-term contracts are likely to out-
compete LNG.  
2) The break-even price range of LNG projects in 
potential supplier countries (US, Canada, 
Australia, East Africa) enumerated in the 
consultation paper ($9-12/MMbtu)8 is higher 
than the above-presented LNG prices. 
3) The development of natural gas demand 
remains unclear explaining the unwillingness of 
EU midstream utilities to contract high amounts 
of LNG with a destination to the EU.  
As shown in Figure 2, LNG volumes contracted 
for the period 2015-2020 seem to exceed projected 
demand. This suggests that a loose, over-
contracted market will last until the end of this 
decade and would support the currently 
experienced low LNG prices. While the 
consultation paper notes that “capital investment 
costs nevertheless remain substantial, 
particularly for liquefaction plant”, one should 
not forget that LNG export project costs almost 
quadrupled over the last decade (from $300/tpa 
in 2000 to $1200/tpa in 2013).9 In today’s buyer’s 
market, this means that some projects will not go 
ahead. Hence, in the long-term, the market is 
likely to tighten as projects and final investment 
decisions (FIDs) are delayed pending a more 
favourable market environment where demand 
or the willingness to pay a risk premium 
generates prices above breakeven. The 
consultation paper does not address the 
questions either of demand or the willingness to 
pay a risk premium.  
Similarly to LNG, the increase of gas storage 
volumes (by almost 27% between 2009 and 2015, 
from 85 bcm to 108 bcm) occurred in a market 
environment, where storage has a low value. As 
noted in the consultation paper “the current 
willingness to pay for gas storage is in some cases 
barely sufficient to cover the marginal cost of 
storage operations”. For instance, Centrica’s SBU 
decreased by 57% between the 2008-09 and 2015-
16 storage years.  This is partly due to the 
decreasing demand, but also because the overall 
gas system is becoming more flexible (increasing 
interconnectivity and LNG regasification 
capacities, spot trading and declining price 
spread between seasons).   
These issues related to LNG and gas storage can 
be addressed if there is a shared view on the 
natural gas market, which also includes an 
understanding of natural gas in the EU electricity 
market.   
 
 
                                                   
8 Various estimates (OIES, CEDIGAZ). 
9 Tpa refers to tonnes per annum. For an analysis of 
this issue, see Brian Songhurts, “LNG Plant Cost 
Escalation”, 17 February 2014 
(http://www.oxfordenergy.org/ 
wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/NG-83.pdf). 
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Figure 2. Signed long-term LNG contracts (2015-35) 
 
Source: GIIGNL, Companies’ websites. 
The need for sufficient infrastructure  
Given that some 95% of existing EU LNG import 
capacity is in Western Europe (ES, UK, IT, FR, 
NL, BE, PT, SE),10 the LNG and storage strategy 
should explicitly aim at improving access to LNG 
particularly in Eastern European countries 
currently dependent on only one import source. 
Indeed, to fully exploit the benefits that could 
arise from LNG in this region, the EU needs a 
system of interconnectivity. Such a system would 
require: 1) additional infrastructure, either in the 
form of interconnectors or additional LNG 
terminals, including flexible LNG Floating 
Storage and Regasification Units (FSRU); 2) a 
clear regulatory framework avoiding contractual 
                                                   
10 GIE, LNG Map, May 2015 
(www.gie.eu/index.php/maps-data/lng-map).  
11 GIE, ENTSOG. 
12 See, for instance, “LNG Terminal in Swinoujscie – 
an important investment for Poland’s and regional 
energy security”, 31 March 2014 
(www.msp.gov.pl/en/polish-economy/economic-
congestion at the interconnection points and 3) 
properly functioning gas hubs facilitating trade. 
The need for better gas interconnections is most 
evident in the Baltic region, where currently 
Lithuania (with 4 bcma of LNG importing 
capacity) has an interconnection of 2 bcma only 
with Latvia, while Estonia (planning 6.5 bcma of 
LNG-importing capacity) has currently no gas 
interconnectors with its Baltics neighbours.11 
Similarly, while presenting its future Swinoujscie 
LNG import plant (5 bcma capacity),12 Poland 
has no major interconnectors with most of its 
neighbours and no transmission capacity will be 
added under ENTSOG’s Capacity Low Firm 
Scenario (based on the FIDs already taken).13  
news/5297,LNG-Terminal-in-Swinoujscie-an-
important-investment-for-Polands-and-regional-
ene.html). 
13 ENTSOG.  
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035
Portfolio Europe ROW China Japan South-Korea Trade projection
6 | MOLNAR, BEHRENS, EGENHOFER & GENOESE 
 
Despite the importance of the interconnectors, 
investors do not seem to be queuing up for new 
projects14 due to various well-known barriers. 
The issue of the regulatory and political 
framework plays a major role, as does the 
question about future gas demand. The rate of 
return set by national regulatory regimes, the 
market environment and economic growth, the 
clarity of signals from EU energy policy and 
impacts from the energy transition matter 
significantly.15  
Interconnections certainly are important for the 
LNG strategy but they should not be the sole 
focus. While increasing gas interconnections 
between Spain and France, for example, could 
increase EU security of supply, there may be 
lower-costs solutions to achieve the same 
objective. For example, it may be more cost-
effective to build an LNG terminal close to a 
vulnerable zone (e.g. South-Eastern Europe) 
rather than deploying large interconnection or 
reverse flow capacities. Also, LNG Floating 
Storage and Regasification Units (FSRU) may 
turn out to be more cost-effective than new 
pipelines. While a pipeline built mainly for 
security of supply reasons will remain unused 
most of the time, an FSRU that is not used can be 
disconnected and used for trading. Another 
alternative is to reload16 the gas. Many LNG 
terminals allow for this. The type of 
infrastructure to be built should depend on a 
                                                   
14 ENTSOG’s data show that final investment 
decisions (FIDs) have been taken for only 15% of the 
total proposed transmission capacity by 2020 (20,793 
GWh/day). This would add 3,177 GWh/day 
(approximately 100 bcma) of (full) interconnection 
capacity to the EU gas system. 
15 ENTSOG, TYNDP 2015, Main Report 
(www.entsog.eu/public/uploads/files/publications
/TYNDP/2015/entsog_TYNDP2015_main_report_lo
wres.pdf). 
16 ‘Reloading’ refers to the transfer of LNG from the 
LNG reservoirs of the terminal into a vessel (GIE, 
2015). 
17 “‘Contractual congestion’ means a situation where 
the level of firm capacity demand exceeds the 
technical capacity”as defined in Articles 2(21) and 
2(23) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009. 
cost-benefit analysis that properly values 
security of supply.  
Apart from cost-effective additional 
infrastructure, another major issue is contractual 
congestion.17 According to ACER’s annual report 
around 15% of interconnection points still 
suffered from contractual congestion in 2014, 
resulting in sub-optimal capacity utilisation.18 
A third issue is the absence of well-functioning 
natural gas hubs in the CEE region and the 
Iberian Peninsula. According to the EFET’s Gas 
Hub Assessments, in 2015 most of the regional 
hubs are lacking basic characteristics such as a 
consultation mechanism in English, cash-out 
rules, standardised contracts or accessibility to 
non-physical traders. The Romanian, Bulgarian 
and Mibgas hubs are still in their nascent phase, 
with the appropriate legislative and regulatory 
framework yet to be set.19 While it is debatable 
whether there is a need for more benchmark hubs 
(serving as reference markets “that people can 
price their contracts on”)20 there is certainly a 
need for hubs serving as a platform for physical 
balancing in the CEE and the Iberian Peninsula. 
Cost-effective investment in gas infrastructure, 
improving the procedures coping with 
contractual congestion and developing gas hubs 
in the CEE region and the Iberian Peninsula are 
crucial to achieve a better level of system 
efficiency of the EU gas market.  
18 ACER, ACER 2015 Report on Congestion at IPs in 
2014, 10 February 2015 (http://www.acer.europa.eu/ 
Official_documents/Acts_of_the_Agency/Publicatio
n/20150529_ACER%202015%20Report%20on%20Co
ngestion%20at%20IPs%20in%202014.pdf). 
19 See in more detail: EFET, 2015 Review of Gas Hub 
Assessments (http://www.efet.org/Cms_Data/ 
Contents/EFET/Folders/Documents/EnergyMarket
s/VTP_Assessment/~contents/SBX28G3U3L2PNND
5/2015-Review-of-Hub-Scores_final.xlsx). 
20 See Natural Gas Europe, Reaching a Fully 
Liberalised and Single EU Gas Market – Interview 
with Patrick Heather, 10 February 2015 
(http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/liberalised-
single-gas-market-interview-patrick-heather-oies). 
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This would also “enable all Member States to 
benefit from access to the international LNG 
market”, as proclaimed in the consultation paper. 
However, to achieve this, it seems more 
appropriate to develop an overall gas strategy in 
order to approach the issue of LNG and gas 
storage in a comprehensive manner. Such a 
strategy needs to focus on the market realities.   
The need for an innovation-driven 
strategy 
Although “research and innovation” is a separate 
dimension of the EU’s Energy Union strategy, the 
LNG and storage strategy should mention the 
considerable innovation potential of natural gas 
in order to give a perspective on the potential 
long-term role of gas in the decarbonisation 
process of the EU energy system.  
There is considerable prospect for numerous 
emerging technologies related to natural gas, 
including in particular the following: 
(1) Production and use of biomethane. In 
2013 around 1.3 bcm of biomethane 
(cleaned biogas) was produced in the EU 
and Switzerland.21 The industry’s main 
concerns are the uncertainties regarding 
the EU energy and climate change policies 
post-2020 and the difficulty to form a 
European biomethane market. Indeed, the 
slow process of elaborating EU standards 
for biomethane hinders its trade and its use 
as a vehicle fuel. The European Committee 
for Standardisation (CEN) has been 
drafting the specifications of biomethane 
for the injection into natural gas grids and 
the use as vehicle fuel since 2010.22 
                                                   
21 European Biogas Association, Biomethane Statistics 
(http://european-biogas.eu/wp-content/uploads/ 
2014/12/Biomethane-graph-20131.png). 
22 CEN/TC 408 - Project Committee - Natural gas and 
biomethane for use in transport and biomethane for 
injection in the natural gas grid 
(http://standards.cen.eu/dyn/www/f?p=204:22:0::::
FSP_ORG_ID,FSP_LANG_ID:853454,25&cs=1A6E288
5FFA69ED2A8C4FA137A6CEF3DA). 
(2) Natural gas in transport. Besides LNG, 
Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) and 
Adsorbed Natural Gas (ANG) should be 
considered as part of the solution to 
decarbonise the EU transport system. 
While the CNG and LNG-fuelled 
combustion engines are mature 
technologies requiring support at the 
deployment phase, ANG is currently in the 
“valley of death” between R&D and the 
demonstration stage. ANG stores natural 
gas at 35 bar, enabling a volumetric 
efficiency increase of more than 25% 
compared with traditional CNG storage 
cylinders.23 Hence, this technology would 
be more suitable for use in light-duty 
vehicles (responsible for 15% of EU CO2 
emissions).24 
(3) Power-to-gas. The transport and heating 
sector can also be decarbonised by creating 
synthetic methane from renewable 
electricity (so-called ‘power-to-gas’). This 
technology branch should be further 
explored, especially because existing gas 
infrastructure could be used to transport 
and distribute this synthetic methane. 
Moreover, power-to-gas stations could 
provide demand-side flexibility to the 
electricity sector, i.e. produce when there is 
a surplus of renewable electricity. 
23 For more on ANG, see Y. Ginzburg, ANG Storage as 
a Technological Solution for the “Chicken-and-Egg” 
Problem of NGV Refueling Infrastructure 
Development, 23rd World Gas Conference, 
Amsterdam 2006 (http://apvgn.pt/wp-content/ 
uploads/adsorbed_ng.pdf). 
24 European Commission, Road transport: Reducing 
CO2 emissions from vehicles (http://ec.europa.eu/ 
clima/policies/transport/vehicles/index_en.htm). 
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